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SUMMARY
The Quiet Short-Haul Research Aircraft (QSRA) Project, one of the largest
aeronautical programs undertaken by NASA to date, achieved a significant cost
underrun. This is attributed to numerous factors, not the least of which
were the contractual arrangement and the system of cost and schedule manage-
ment employed by the contractor. This paper summarizes that system and the
methods used for cost/performance measurement by the contractor and by the
NASA project management. Recommendations are made for the use of some of
these concepts for future programs of a similar nature.
INTRODUCTION
The QSRA is a flight research facility to be used by the government to
develop design criteria and airworthiness standards for quiet, propulsive-
lift transports. The research application of the aircraft is focused on
takeoff and landing and other terminal-area operations associated with the
propulsive-lift mode of flight. The most important priorities for the
program were safety, cost, and research capability, in that order. Conse-
quently, the general approach for the aircraft design effort was to "design
to cost," with emphasis on minimizing absolute cost and/or maximizing
research capability per dollar, but with no compromises in flight safety.
In February 1976, the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company was selected
by NASA to design and build the Quiet Short-Haul Research Aircraft (QSRA).
The source selection process included a competitive negotiation between
Boeing and one other major contractor. The Boeing contract was negotiated
first. During negotiations substantial reductions were made in engineering
and manufacturing man-hours. Commensurate work statement reductions were
made in some, but by no means in all areas. At the same time, Boeing
proposed a cost-share-award-fee type contract wherein the contractor shared
$1,200,000, or approximately 6% of the $20 million initial contract cost.
The contractor was also to receive an award fee, based on performance, which,
at the discretion of the government, could range from 0 to 5% of government
target cost. There was no base fee. In addition, the contractor offered to
share 50% of any overrun, up to a maximum overrun share of $2 million for
a potential share of $3,200,000. Thus, in addition to the stated NASA
priority of low cost, there was a strong financial incentive for the
contractor to remain within and perform under the budget. The Boeing project
team responded to this challenge with a strong technical and management
performance which resulted in delivery of the airplane one month ahead of
schedule and $2.6 million (12%) under target cost, and which earned the
contractor 100% of the available award fee for each of the six award fee
periods through aircraft delivery.
There are many factors, both technical and economic, which contributed
to the underrun on the QSRA contract. These will be discussed in more detail
in a subsequent paper. Some may be unique to this program. One factor not
unique to this program, however, is' the program control method employed.
Indications of favorable cost performance were apparent early in the program.
Several design trade-offs resulting in improved producibility were developed
in the early stages of the program. Also, many engineering and manufacturing
activities were on or ahead of schedule and on or below budget. This
performance was reinforced through the NASA project management approach to
defer contract additions, whenever possible, until funding availability
within 'the original budget was assured by realization of the anticipated
underrun.
The purpose of this paper is to document the cost and schedule control
and cost/performance measurement techniques used on the QSRA project in the
hope that they may prove useful on future programs of a similar nature.
PROGRAM COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL
The objective of a program control system is to provide cost and
schedule performance visibility in a timely fashion to both contractor and
government functional managers and to senior management personnel in order
to ensure project completion within the budget. The system should permit
early detection of problems and accurate assessment of their impact. It
should support frequent and up-to-date status reporting and management
review for decision making purposes. It is highly desirable that the system
produce a common set of cost reports for review by both contractor and^
government personnel. This facilitates communication and minimizes the
nonproductive effort that often goes into report generation as well as the
errors introduced in most cost data manipulations.
Boeing used established in-house program control systems for the QSRA.
Existing systems were adapted for work authorization, budgeting, scheduling,
cost accumulation, performance measurement and reporting. Schedules and
budgets were established at level 2, 3, and 4 (major activities only) of
the work breakdown structure (WBS) shown in figure 1. The functional
manager assigned to each WBS element was responsible for cost and schedule
performance as well as technical achievement. Work authorizations were used
to assign manpower and schedules for each job assignment, with charge numbers
traceable to each WBS element, organization, and cost element.
The program director controlled the total budget, allocating task
budgets to each functional manager at 90% of the contract target cost;
this established a 10% initial management reserve. The program director then
used the reserve to adjust budgets for things outside the functional managers'
control, such as overhead rate changes, internal work statement growth, labor
rate increases, and schedule changes.
Boeing employed a "dynamic" budget concept for the QSRA. Contract
target cost increases for external work statement growth were allocated
among the appropriate WBS elements and the management reserve. Budget trans-
fers between the management reserve and other WBS accounts or inter-WBS
transfers were made for work package refinements or for the reasons discussed
above. All changes required concurrence of the program director and imme-
diate notification to NASA of the reasons.
Although arguments are often made against it there are valid reasons for
permitting the budget baseline to change on a program like QSRA. A budget
which reflects design changes, overhead rate changes, etc., is more realistic;
hence, .it sustains the motivation and concern of functional managers far
better than one which is hopelessly obsolete. It also provides a more
accurate cost picture to project management within the company and the
government, and facilitates realistic estimates of cost at completion,
earned value, etc. There are disadvantages as well. A changing budget
baseline requires considerable effort to maintain. Unless closely controlled,
it could be used to hide performance problems. For this reason it is some-
times called a "rubber budget" (ref. 1). Nevertheless, the project manage-
ment at Boeing and NASA agreed that for a closely knit organization such as
existed for QSRA, the advantages of rebudgeting outweighed the disadvantages.
The excellent communication between Boeing and NASA counterparts was a key
factor in that decision. Also, the general underrun condition early in the
contract helped considerably.
Actual costs were accumulated through an automated system with tracking
by cost element, by WBS, and by organization. This system provided reports
by WBS of labor costs on a weekly basis, and a monthly comparison of actual
costs (labor and nonlabor) with budgets. Estimates at completion were
prepared quarterly by each functional manager to provide the basis for higher
management action.
Schedules were established for each WBS element. Significant milestone
events were identified for activities to which individual budgets were
assigned. Within engineering, the milestones included significant tests,
analyses required in support of design, or design release items for which
release dates mutually acceptable to engineering and manufacturing had been
established. Within manufacturing, milestones included completion of major
components or assemblies.
Cost and schedule information was displayed on a common grid for each
WBS and posted on the walls of a program control room. The common grid was
very useful in providing visual cost/schedule "integration." The control
room also served as the location for biweekly program review meetings,
where management and other key personnel reviewed cost, schedule, and
technical performance.
CONTRACTOR REPORTING
The contract specified that monthly financial reports should include
NASA Form 533M and 533P (ref. 2), or the contractor's equivalent system, for
each WBS element. NASA Form 533Q reports were required quarterly. The
level of detail for each WBS element was left to negotiation.
The computerized cost management system used by Boeing Commercial
Airplane Co. - Engineering Division for research contracts reported cost by
WBS element, cost element, and functional organization. It readily lends
itself to generation of the 533M and 533Q reports. Therefore, these reports
were submitted for all level 3 WBS elements, and at level 4 for high cost
items such as wing box, wing trailing edge, and major systems.
The system does not as easily support the generation of the 533P since
the basic data elements, planned value of work accomplished and percent
completion, are not able to be derived from the computerized cost manage-
ment system without special input and reprogramming. It seemed nonproductive
to require submission of the 533P at level 3 of the WBS for several reasons.
First, the estimates of planned value of completed work would be quite
subjective and therefore of questionable validity. Second, Boeing would not
rely on this information for cost control, and cost visibility to NASA would
not be significantly enhanced over that available from the alternate
financial reports received in lieu of 533P. Finally, it would be costly to
prepare because the contractor would have to assign both direct and overhead
personnel to generate level 4 supporting data and reports. Therefore, the
533P was required only at level 2 of the QSRA WBS.
The time lag usually present in cost reporting makes problems late in
surfacing. Since the objective of the government project office is to help
prevent an overrun rather than just do a good job of tracking one, it was
judged most useful for NASA to obtain reports which were compatible with the
Boeing cost control system. These could then be updated in the interim
period by the resident manager in his weekly reports in order to provide
near real-time cost monitoring. The expense of preparing the monthly report
would be only that of duplicating existing data rather than generating new
data. Most important, the information available from the Boeing internal
system appeared to meet NASA's needs for cost surveillance very well.
The monthly reports ultimately provided for each WBS level are shown
in figure 2. The information which proved to be most useful in tracking
progress, identifying potential cost or schedule problems, and assessing
program impact is that listed as "533P equivalent." These reports were a
combination of graphical and tabular data, which permitted a rapid assess-
ment of trends as well as absolute cost values at any point in time. If a
cost growth problem developed, these charts also permitted identification of
the cause, which might be due to schedule slippages, labor rates, manloading
variations, material usage, or other factors. Examples of these reports are
discussed below.
Figure 3 illustrates the milestone schedule for the wing trailing edge,
a level 4 WBS element. Status is shown as of February 28, 1977 (12 mo after
contract go-ahead) for this and the following figures. The schedule relates
design, analysis, and manufacturing milestones to the major milestones of
the program, and identifies specific events which are readily monitored. It
also shows that the 25% drawing release point was reached 6 wk ahead of
schedule, while rib fabrication was started 10 wk early. This chart was
updated biweekly in the Boeing control room and submitted to NASA monthly.
The engineering release status for the wing trailing edge is shown in
figure 4. This chart was updated weekly. It compares the actual number of
releases to the number committed in joint negotiations with manufacturing
personnel. These consisted of. both drawings and advance material releases,
and it is important that both be on schedule since material must be ordered
and the manufacturing manload and machine tool usage must be scheduled. The
chart gives a good indication of the progress of the design effort and also
suggests that the manufacturing planning activity should be progressing
satisfactorily, since there were 12 releases ahead of schedule and (equally
important) none behind at that time.
Figure 5 measures manufacturing labor progress. It compares cumulative
actual manufacturing man-hours to the budgeted hours for this WBS element.
It also shows the "earned" value, which is the estimated, or shop budget
man-hours for work completed. There was no partial credit earned for work
started but not yet completed nor for an allocatable portion of the
management reserve, so the reported earned value was conservative. This is
very important. Many earned value systems give 50% credit when work is
started, thus creating an erroneous impression that progress is greater than
it really is, and hiding cost problems for an extended period of time.
In addition to the three measures of schedule/functional performance,
there were two important measures of cost reported for each WBS element.
One, shown in figure 6, was manloading. Budgeted and actual manpower levels
in engineering and operations (manufacturing and test support) were reported
weekly. This report provided a check on cost and schedule performance in
two ways: 1) early indications of technical problems are often evident in
manloading deviations from plan; 2) excessive manpower levels, or failure
to off-load personnel upon task completion, will quickly affect cost
performance but would be reflected in the weekly manpower reports earlier
than in the monthly cost reports. In this case, the schedule acceleration
reported in figures 3, 4, and 5 was achieved even though engineering and
operations manpower levels were under budget, a happy situation indeed!
The most important financial data to monitor for each WBS element is
the comparison of actual and budgeted costs relative to scheduled event
completion. Figure 7 illustrates that cumulative actual cost for the wing
trailing edge was modestly below budget although the engineering and manu-
facturing effort was ahead of schedule. Moreover, the manager's estimate
at completion (MEAC) was projecting a budget underrun of $82 thousand (8%)
through the conclusion of effort on that WBS element. It should be
remembered that the budget value on this chart is less than the contract
value by the amount of the management reserve (10%) extracted at contract
go-ahead by Boeing's program director. By the end of the program the budget
on this WBSE was underrun by a substantial amount.
If cost problems had developed, additional visibility was available
through the variance report shown at the left of figure 7. This itemized
the cost variance by cost element in order to pinpoint the source of the
problem. The analysis was made whenever a WBS element exceeded its budget
by 10%.
COST/PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
Cost/performance measurement on the QSRA contract was made on a weekly
basis. The internal cost management system provided weekly output of
assigned manpower and total labor charges by WBS element. The respective
control room charts were updated weekly and the data was made available to
the NASA resident manager for his weekly report to project management at
Ames. Thus, both the contractor and the government received a weekly
comparison of actual cost vs budget. Other data received weekly were
current actual and cumulative average labor rates by functional organization
(design, technology, manufacturing), additions or reductions in management
reserve, and a comparison of actual vs scheduled engineering releases. These
were carefully monitored for signs of trouble.
In addition to having Boeing cost and schedule reports, the NASA
resident manager attended weekly staff meetings held by the program manager
and the design, technology, and manufacturing groups. He also made daily
visits to all areas of the plant where QSRA work was in progress. This was
very important for it provided an independent assessment of schedule
progress vs cost accumulation. The value of this "informal" cost/performance
measurement can hardly be overemphasized. It lends.credence to the formal
reports and provides an indication of potential' problems much earlier than
does a month-end statement of expenditures.
Several types of cost/performance measurement were applied by the QSRA
project office at Ames. The weekly and monthly cost reports were carefully
checked for the obvious clues to cost and schedule problems. Fortunately,
there were few of any significance to be found. Occasionally an overbudget
situation developed in a particular WBS element. Examination of the related
schedule chart, engineering release performance curve, or manufacturing
earned value data usually showed that it was because work was being accom-
plished ahead of schedule. When the work accomplished appeared to be
consistent with the man-hours expended, no action was taken beyond a
discussion of the situation with the NASA resident manager or the contractor.
When the work accomplished was less than the effort expended, or when
both cost and schedule performance were inadequate, an impact analysis was
made. This consisted of an examination of both the budget and schedule for
that WBS element. If the total budget was small, a 10% or 20% cost overrun
would not be of great significance to the total program. Since on the QSRA
program these were always offset by underbudget performance in other areas,
they were noted for future observation but the "panic button" was not pushed.
It is to be expected that some WBS elements will overrun and some will under-
run on any program. This occurs, in part, because the original budgets are
established early in the program when there are many unknowns and therefore
may not accurately reflect the required effort in different areas, and, in
part, because of the many factors which affect the actual performance.
The performance discrepancies of greatest concern were the schedule
slips in areas affecting other activities or WBS elements. Schedule
performance, per se, was of the lowest priority on the QSRA program (i.e.,
program cost or aircraft performance and safety was never to be compromised
to meet a schedule). On the other hand, a delay on one relatively low-
budget .item (engineering release or manufactured part) can hold up other
major activities, resulting in a significant reduction in overall produc-
tivity. Both Boeing and NASA project management were very conscious of this
and monitored the milestone schedules closely. During the contractor
functional organizations' weekly meetings, the effects of anticipated and
actual late completions were evaluated, and "workaround" solutions were
presented at management status meetings.
The contractor's management reserve was monitored carefully by the Ames
project office, since it gives early warning of deviations from plan. Two
values of management reserve were reported by the contractor, as indicated
on figure 8. One was based on the internal budget and represented the
unallocated contract funds held in reserve by the program director. The
other reserve value was based on the WBS managers' estimates at completion
for each WBS and represented the outlook at the "working level." Typically,
the latter value is optimistic since people are either slow to recognize
or hesitant to admit to problems in their areas of responsibility. On the
QSRA, however, these estimates were quite realistic, and often conservative.
The management reserve was sometimes distorted when budgets were
allocated for work authorized by contract change order but not yet
definitized. Fluctuations in the mid.1978 time period reflect this (fig. 8).
In such cases the reserve was replenished after the contract modifications
were negotiated.
Also shown on figure 8 is the hypothetical depletion of the reserve
which would occur if each WBS activity expended the funding level negotiated
into the contract. The initial management reserve was created by reducing
the budget for each WBS element by 10% from the contract value. If the
cost of each activity had been estimated exactly, each budget would overrun
by the ratio 10/9 and the reserve would be depleted in accordance with the
total projected spending rate as shown. While no one expected the reserve
to be depleted in precisely that fashion, the changing value of the actual
management reserve, relative to that hypothetical depletion rate, was
considered by the NASA project management to be an important measure of the
financial health of the contract. This was particularly true during the
early months of the program when design changes, including cost saving
changes, were occuring and manpower levels were building up. Good cost
performance reflected by the consistently favorable management reserve during
the course of the program provided an increasing degree of confidence that a
cost underrun might be realized.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The objective of a cost and schedule management system is to help
project managers to meet program objectives with available resources. To
meet this objective the system must accurately report actual expenditures
and accomplishments in each WBS element. It should provide early detection
of problems and help support development of cost-effective solutions. It
should.also foster cost consciousness among functional managers and
facilitate performance measurement by top management. The suitability of
competing contractors' cost management systems should be considered in the
source selection process.
The system used by Boeing on the QSRA contract met the objectives
admirably. It was adapted from existing systems of work authorization and
cost accumulation, and hence its maintenance did not impose a financial
burden on the contract. Yet the information available on a weekly and
monthly basis was adequate for cost and schedule surveillance and program
planning by both contractor and government project management.
The information provided in lieu of the 533P report was especially
useful in trend analysis and in measuring cost and schedule performance.
This type of information may not be adequate for all programs, and may not
even be available in many instances. Nevertheless, government project
managers should review alternate financial reports and consider accepting
reports based on the contractor's internal cost and schedule management
system whenever practical.
The informal cost and schedule performance measurement available through
the NASA resident office proved very effective for the QSRA Project. Use
of a resident office is recommended for all programs with a large budget
or significant advance in the state of the art. Information is available
sooner and is probably more candid than could be expected in formal written
financial reports. The nature and sources of problems are identified in
detail, and the preferred solution can be communicated to the contractor
without delay.
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WBS LEVEL
|3 M
PROGRAM
ANALYSIS
Aerodynamics
Propulsion
Structures
Systems
Flight Controls
Weights
Noise
Analysis, General
AIRPLANE STRUCTURE
Wing
Leading Edge
Wing Box
Trailing Edge
Body
Nacelle
Landing Gear
Empennage
Receivals and Layup
Airplane Structure, General
AIRPLANE SYSTEMS
Electrical /Electronics
Personnel /Cargo
Flight Controls
Electrical
Mechanical
ECS/Pneumatics
Propulsion
Engine Buildup
Fuel System
Hydraulics
Airplane Systems, General
TESTING
Mockup
Simulation
BLC System Calibration
Systems Functional Test
Ground Test
Contractor Flgiht Test
Support to NASA Flight Test
PRODUCT ASSURANCE
Quality Assurance
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Contractor Management
Engine Support
SPARES & GFE REPAIR
Figure 1.— QSRA work breakdown structure.
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a
Report UBS Level
533M/533Q 1, 2, 3, 4
533P . 1, 2
533P Equivalent 3, 4
0
 Milestone Schedules
0
 Engineering Releases
0
 Manufacturing Earned Value
0
 Manpower
0
 Total Cost
Supplemental Data
0
 Budget Visibility Report .1, 2, 3
0
 Labor & Overhead Rates 1
Figure 2.— Monthly financial reporting.
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